Why is the flame of the "Soldat inconnu" rekindled on February 28?

Each February 28, the "Amicale National des Fusiliers Marins et Commandos" (ANFMC) organizes a commemorative ceremony at the Arc de Triomphe. By rekindling the flame of the "Soldat Inconnu", the association honors the memory of Charles Trépel, his comrades-in-arms, as well as all the "Naval fusiliers and Commandos" who were killed or went missing during overseas operations.

Through this gathering, the ANFMC preserves the memory of their commitment, courage, and sacrifice in the service of France, while passing on to current and future generations the duty of remembrance and the values upheld by these men.

Hardtack 36 Raid – “Premium” – February 28, 1944

A new raid, code-named Premium, was commissioned by the Intelligence Service. Trépel was placed in charge of the operation. His group was to land 8 kilometers north of Scheveningen, on the beach at Wassenaar, with the mission of scouting a V2 rocket launch site.

Why this mission, and why was Trépel chosen to lead it? Part of the answer lies in his background. As a child, he had spent holidays in the region with Dutch industrialists and family friends, the Van den Berghs. He spoke not only German fluently, but also Dutch.

Since the Dutch troops of No. 10 Inter-Allied Commando had departed for the Far East shortly beforehand and were therefore unavailable, Trépel appeared to be the most capable person to carry out the operation. He also had extensive knowledge of rockets, which he had studied in depth. He had attended the same school and club as Wernher von Braun, the designer of the V2 rockets he was tasked with investigating, and possibly finding a way to destroy (either by mapping the area for a bombing raid or by assessing the feasibility of sabotage).

The group trained throughout the second half of February 1944 while awaiting departure orders from the port of Great Yarmouth. A first attempt was made on February 24, but they had to turn back due to a technical issue (radio navigation) aboard the motor torpedo boat. The convoy even encountered German vessels on the return journey.

On February 27, the team, Charles Trépel, Antoine Grossi, André Lallier, Fernand Devillers, René Guy, Jacquelin Rivière, Jean Hagnéré, and Roger Cabanella,set out again from Great Yarmouth at around 4 p.m. aboard MTB 617. They reached the coast around 1:30 a.m., two hours behind schedule due to further navigation problems and the need to avoid an enemy convoy.

The dory (a small, quiet motorboat), towing a small inflatable dinghy, was launched and headed toward the shore. Ten minutes after departure, red flares were fired from the beach by German forces. The dory was just 30 meters away.

The six French commandos (Lallier remained aboard the MTB as backup, and Grossi stayed on the dory as coxswain) boarded the inflatable boat as three more flares, red, green, and white, were fired from the shore. The enemy appeared to have been alerted. Common sense would have dictated aborting the mission, but Trépel chose to proceed and landed at 2:00 a.m.

The dory withdrew slightly to avoid detection and waited. Time passed. Shouts and barking dogs could be heard. More flares were fired regularly until 4:45 a.m. Lights were seen, but no gunfire or explosions were heard. Concern grew. Trépel and his men should have returned by 4:30 a.m. Grossi and the British commando Sayers, aboard the dory, radioed the MTB requesting another thirty minutes. Finally, at 5:00 a.m., they reluctantly returned to the MTB, which sped back to England before dawn.

Procedure dictated that the MTB should return the following night to retrieve the team if they had not been able to re-embark. However, the boat’s commander, Bradford, received strict orders not to return, on the grounds that weather conditions were far too unfavorable.

The mystery surrounding this operation raised many questions among the French commandos, who struggled to understand its true purpose. Had Trépel’s group been sacrificed?

Months passed. Everyone hoped for the group’s return. But nothing came.

In May 1945, more than a year after the operation, while French commandos were in the Netherlands, Commander Kieffer sought to uncover what had happened and tasked Lieutenant Hulot with the investigation. He gathered information from Dutch resistance leaders, German prisoners (infantry, sailors, SS, police), the Dutch police, the Intelligence Service, and even the two heads of the Gestapo in Rotterdam, Major Schneider and Hauptmann Munt. Nothing. No one seemed aware of any commando operation in the region that had ended in disaster.

Hulot visited numerous cemeteries, notably in Spuiden and Zandvoort, where he noted several graves of unidentified Allied soldiers, but none matched the timeline. He proposed two hypotheses: either Trépel’s team had been killed by mines or gunfire (though no such sounds were heard that night) and buried anonymously, or they had been captured alive by the Gestapo and later made to disappear.

Captain Miles Belleville of Combined Operations took over the investigation. Together, they eventually traced the French commandos to six graves in The Hague military cemetery, identified by the Germans as unknown Allied airmen, but with dates of death roughly corresponding to the group’s disappearance (buried March 6, except for a sixth body buried May 10).

Lieutenants Hulot and Lavezzi, along with several non-commissioned officers and sailors, were ordered to identify the bodies.

For them, there was no doubt about the identities, particularly coffin No. 78:

Very well preserved, stocky and strong body; dressed in underwear and a white woolen army-style shirt, black curly hair. This body was immediately identified as Captain Charles Trépel, service number 54454, seconded from the Army to the Free French Naval Forces.

Although a widely held belief suggests they were tortured to death, this remains speculation based solely on earlier hypotheses. Examination of the bodies revealed no specific wounds, though “all bore on their faces the expression of having suffered terribly.” Concluding that this suffering resulted from torture is therefore not supported by tangible evidence.

Another, more plausible hypothesis, based on verifiable evidence, has been proposed. Research by historian P. H. Kamphuis uncovered a German report describing the discovery of the six Frenchmen’s bodies.

The day after the raid, February 29, 1944, at 2:30 a.m., German soldiers from the fortified position WN 37 (Widerstandsnest 37) were alerted by the discovery of a dinghy on the shore containing three bodies. A fourth body was found in the same area shortly afterward. The Wassenaar police were tasked with recovering them. These were Jean Hagnéré, René Guy, Jacquelin Rivière, and Roger Cabanella. Charles Trépel’s body was found a week later, apparently after drifting at sea. Two months later, south of Wassenaar, a sixth body was discovered, Fernand Devillers.

The most plausible explanation is that Trépel and his men hid in the dunes until the German alert subsided, then waited for the MTB to return the following night, as procedure dictated. The freezing temperatures that night, combined with strong winds, and their soaked condition, despite their endurance, likely led to death by hypothermia for most of the team, and probably drowning for Trépel and Devillers.

Less dramatic than a death by torture, the hypothesis of a team succumbing to cold, exhaustion, or drowning is therefore the most likely. Especially since, had they been tortured and executed (and no evidence of torture was found), the Germans would not have entrusted their remains to Dutch civilian authorities.

Benjamin Massieu

Philippe Kieffer – Chef des commandos de la France libre

Preface by Admiral Prazuck

Éditions Pierre de Taillac